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OBITER DICTA
"An obiter dictum, in the language of the law, is a gratuitous opinion, an
individual impertinence, which, whether it be wise or foolish, right or wrong,
bindeth none-not even the lips that utter it."*

AN ANCIENT MAX=h

"I need hardly repeat that I detest the attempt to filter the law by maxims. They
are almost invariably misleading," warns Lord Esher M. R., in Yarmouth v. France,
19 Q. B. D. 647, 653 (1887). The venerable maxim de
De Minimis
minimis non curat kx like its brother maxims is not invulnon
nerable to this caustic observation. But the learned Lord's
Curat Lex
sweeping indictment against the utility of maxims is itself a
generalization which does not always fit the facts. Enunciated early in the common law [Taverner v. Dominum Cromwell, Cro. Eliz. 353, 78
Eng. Reprints 601 (1594)], the de minnis standard has served and continues to
serve the commendable purpose of combing the legal world of distracting picayunes,
of zeroes heaped upon the scales of justice, of minute discrepancies and superfluities.
Armed with this principle, courts have summarily ignored sundry trivialities ranging
from "drippings of mortar" attached to a building (alleged to be an encroachment
making title to an adjacent unimproved lot unmarketable), Ungrich v. Shaft, 119 App.
Div. 843, 105 N. Y. Supp. 1013 (1907), to a refusal by a court to interfere and to
set aside a verdict contended to have been miscalculated by the jury to the extent
of $.78. Brewer v. Tyringham, 29 Mlass. 547 (1832).
But this maxim, inherently helpful, has its manifold exceptions. Its limitations
reside not only in particular instances but also in deep seated categories of the law.
"The maxim 'de ininimis non, curat lex' is never applied to the positive and wrongful
invasion of one's property," cautions Cowen J. in Seneca Road Co. v. Auburn &
Rochester R. R., 5 Hill 170, 175 (N. Y. 1843). Nor has the de minimis principle
any uniform force in the field of contract law: where a contract right is violated at
least nominal damages will be given. See 3 WILLISTON, CONTRAcrS (1920) § 1340.
Specifically, among the so-called negligibles which harass the legal order and
ostensibly work high corruption of do wninimis non curat lex, one of the most diverting is the disarmingly humble indefinite article "aP. How
Multum
this Lilliputian of literature became a B'robdingnagian at
in
law is an interesting story. 1 WoRDs AN'D PmRuAs JUDICrALParvo
t.Y DEFINED (1st ser.) 2, 3. The therein-contained attempt
to define the indefinite is a tribute to a's versatility and legal
agility.
Accordingly, a has been defined as susceptible of meaning "one", "any",
"some"', or "my", depending upon the context in which it is used. To illustrate:
Sec. 177 of the English Property Act of 1925 providing that "a will expressed to be
made in contemplation of a marriage shall not be revoked by the solemnization of
the marriage contemplated" was strictly construed to mean in contemplation of
a particular intended marriage and not any marriage in the future. Sallis v. Jones,
[1936] P. 43. Conversely, where a person contracted to lease for a certain purpose
"a" room that is improved and suitable" he does not bind himself to furnish a particular room but fulfills his contract if he provides any room, improved and suitable. Thomas v. Stewart, 60 Iowa 225, 14 N. W. 247 (1887). A promise to convey
*
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"a house and lot of land on Amity St." was interpreted as a promise of the contracting party to convey 'my house and lot'. Hurley v. Brown, 98 Mass. 545 (1868).
Thus, it is seen that the maze of ambiguity surrounding this mighty atom compels
a thorough judicial search through the legal labyrinths for the intended meaning in
all cases where its construction is involved. Faced with the
importance of the supposedly insignificant "a" and similar
De Minimis
legal "minims", what is the remedy? Certainly it is not to
Cparat
be found in the ouster of the classic maxim de minimis non
Lex
curat lex, which stresses the value of solid substance over
empty form. Despite the complaint of Lord Esher such maxims have a place in the
legal lexicon. To provide for emergencies wherein the old maxim does not fit, why
not frame a new formula designed to rationalize the exceptions to the old principle,
to wit-De minimis curat lex?

THE NEW SIICOSIS STATUTE

Recently the newspapers carried lengthy accounts of the grievous condition of
many workers who had contracted an insidious occupational disease known as
silicosis (more popularly called dust pneumonia) for which
Why A Statute? there was no effective legal redress. Because of the peculiar
nature of the disease, its deleterious effects are often not
manifested until several years after the worker has last been employed in the disease producing industry. See Michna v. Collins Co., 116 Conn. 193, 195, 164 Atl.
60, 63, 184 N. E. 901, 902
502, 503 (1933); Madison v. Wedron Silica Co., 352 Ill.
(1933). Since silicosis was not one of the enumerated occupational diseases covered
by the Workmen's Compensation Act [N. Y. WOPKMEN's COMPENSATION LAW

(1922) § 3] the stricken worker was forced to bring his action in negligence, a cause
which is governed by a three year statute of limitations. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT
(1921) § 49.
The court was then faced with the perplexing dilemma-when does the cause of
action accrue? In the numerous suits which arose counsel for the plaintiff contended
that damage being the gist of an action for negligence, the cause did not arise until
the disease itself was manifest, and that to hold otherwise would place the entire
law of torts in the anomalous position of holding that a man must bring a law suit
to recover damages for injuries before the injuries exist. Schmidt v. Merchant's
Despatch Transp. Co., 76 F. (2d) 115 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935); Schmidt v. Merchant's
Despatch Transp. Co., 244 App. Div. 606, 280 N. Y. Supp. 836 (1935). Unfortunately
for the worker, the court rejected this contention and held that the cause of action
accrued not later than the immediate moment when the worker left this employment.
Undoubtedly the injustice of such a result, which seemingly deprived the worker
of his day in court, was suggested to the legislature. To prevent the future recurrence of such an undesirable situation (the act is not applicable to cases in which the last injurious exposure ocThe Statute
curred prior to September 1, 1935) legislation was passed.
N. Y. WORxEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (1936) §§ 65-72. An examination of this
statute, indubitably enacted for the increased protection of the worker, reveals that
the silicosis victim will in many instances be in a more dangerous position than before its passage. The statute provides that the employer shall be liable only when
the disability results within one year after the last injurious exposure in such employment. N. Y. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (1936) § 67.

It is submitted that in practical effect this is similar to having a one-year statute
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of limitations for the bringing of such actions. This stipulation has been included
despite the fact that it is known that the disease is unDefects
usually slow in making itself manifest. See U. S. Public
in
Health Bull. 187 (1929) at 89. But this is not all-the
Statute
statute further provides that compensation shall not be payable for partial disability but that there must be temporary
or permanent total disability. N. Y. WoRMEN's COMPENSATION LAw (1936) § 66.
Medical authorities find that total disability often does not appear until much longer
than one year has elapsed. See Riddell and Rothwell, Some Clinical and Pathologic
Observations on Silicosis in Ontario (1928) 9 J. Iro. HYGIENE 147. Assuming that
total disability results within two years after the lasf exposure, the worker has no
relief under this statute. Nor can he any longer maintain his action in negligence
because the statute expressly provides that the "liability of an employer . . .shall
be exclusive and in place of any other liability whatsoever...." N. Y. WonnMN's
COMPENSATION LAW (1936) § 72.

"BANx-NITE" LOTTERIES
Every now and again, the commercial mind devises some little attraction to
ensnare the public attention. Such enticements to bashful buyers as "valuable
coupons", given with purchases, [Chamber of Commerce of Plattsmouth v. Kiech,
257 N.W. 493 (Neb. 1934)] or stamps entitling customers to a chance on merchandise,
[State v. Caspare, 115 Md. 7, 80 AUt. 606 (1911)] or even the distribution of excursion tickets by motion picture theatres [People v. Cardas, 28 P. (2d) 99 Cal.
App. 1933)] are all familiar to the layman. At present, the faddish public is enthralled
with the so-called "bank-nite" scheme. In fact, in Chicago so enthusiastic was the
support accorded the idea, that there is now in vogue in that city, an all-day "banknite" plan. Alluring as they are, the layman does not appreciate that these novel
designs to make parting with money as sweet a sorrow as possible often find their
way to court, to gray the legal temple and furrow the legal brow.
Already, the foundations have been laid for two opposing attitudes to the question
of whether or not "bank-nites" are illegal lotteries. Both
Pro
views recognize that there are three elements to a lottery,
and
namely, a prize, a chance to win the prize, and a valuable
CMZ
consideration paid for the chance. In the "bank-nite"
schemes, the first two essentials are eminently present. Prizes
ordinarily are cash. Chances of winning depend upon the operation of the particular
scheme and the number of participants though paradoxically, increasing popularity of
the game spells out a decline in the individual's chance of success. But whether the
third element, the payment of a valuable consideration, is present seems to the courts
debatable, and on that issue they divide.
Two controverted views are discernible in the New York cases. In People v.Miller,
271 N. Y. 44, 2 N. E. (2d) 38 (1936) a "bank-nite" scheme
The Status
was held to be a lottery. Evidence that one might participate
at
without purchasing a ticket of admission vas excluded by
Present
the trial court because it doubted the credibility of the
testimony. Therefore, the issue, as presented to the Court
of Appeals was whether payment entitling one to admission plus a chance to win constitutes payment of a valuable consideration for the chance. It was held that this
amounted to the payment of a valuable consideration. In a more recent cvs?.
People v. Shafer, 160 Misc. 174, 289 N.Y. Supp. 649 (Co. Ct. 1936), a slightly differ-
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ent plan was held not to be a lottery. The generous cinema magnate provided, in
this game, that the purchase of a ticket of admission was not a condition to an opportunity of participating. Moreover the proof in the record revealed that participation
was absolutely free. Elsewhere some support for the stated refinement in the Shafer
case is found. [State v. Hundling, 220 Iowa 1369, 264 N.W. 608 (1936); State v.
Eames, 183 Atl. 590 (N. H. 1936)]. On the other hand, in Central State Theatre
Corp. v. Patz, 11 F. Supp. 566 (S.D. Iowa 1935) and in Commonwealth v. Wall, 3
N. E. (2d) 28 (Mass. 1936), it was held that the game does not cease to be a lottery
because some or many of the players are admitted to play free, provided that others
continue to pay for their chances. In the Massachusetts case the court attempted
to distinguish the Hundling and Eames cases on the ground that in those cases "free
participation was a reality", whereas it was not in the case at bar. Because of the
unconvincing distinction the latter cases seem contra the law as promulgated in the
Shafer case. Likewise they represent a more realistic interpretation of the law. The
defendant's object was to "fill the theatre, not the lobby and the sidewalk." By
strategy the true purpose of the law is evaded.
Writers upon the subject disapprove of the decisions which have allowed schemes,
similar to that in the Shafer case, to prevail. Haley, The
A Benign
Broadcasting and Postal Lottery Statutes (1936) 4 Go.
WAsH. L. REv. 475; Pickett, Contests and the Lottery Laws
Judiciary
(1932) 45 HAxv. L. REv. 1196. It was said in People v.,
Gillson, 109 N.Y. 389, 404, 17 N.E. 343, 348 (1888) that the Legislature sought

to prevent lotteries because the purchase of lottery tickets "cultivates a gambling
spirit, and tends to a hatred of honest labor, and to a desire to obtain riches or money
without the necessary expenditure of industrious energy". Such a distinction as
appears in the Shafer case, indexes the court's reluctance to interfere too strenuously
with the desire of the human race to get something for nothing.*
*

Since the above comment was written, the New York Court of Appeals affirmed

People v. Shafer (3 judges dissenting).

N. Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1937, at p. 8.

